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I. Introduction  
 
The latest twist in the net neutrality debate has prompted a renewed interest in regulatory 
federalism. Opponents of the Federal Communication Commission's Restoring Internet Freedom 
Order (RIF Order)
1
 have turned to state governors' mansions and legislatures, seeking to restore 
at the state level regulatory restrictions that the Commission repealed at the federal level. To 
date, six states have adopted executive orders
2
 and four have passed statutes
3
 that purport to 
impose net neutrality mandates on broadband providers. 
 
Most commentary on state net neutrality has focused on whether the RIF Order preempts these 
state-level initiatives – an issue I addressed in an earlier FSF Perspectives article.4 But there is a 
second, less-often discussed limitation on state power to regulate broadband network 
management practices: the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine prevents states from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce. Previous courts 
have relied on this doctrine to limit state attempts to regulate online conduct. The Internet is a 
national (indeed, global) network, meaning that state attempts to regulate the flow of traffic on 
that network are likely to have extraterritorial effects that burden interstate commerce. As a 
2 
 
result, claims that these rules contravene the Dormant Commerce Clause could well prove a 
difficult obstacle for state attempts to resurrect net neutrality restrictions. 
 
II. The Dormant Commerce Clause and Internet Regulation 
 
The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from enacting regulations that unduly burden 
interstate commerce. It is a judge-made doctrine, derived from the negative implication of the 
Constitution's grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce between the states.
5
 While 
states have general authority to regulate commerce within their footprints, they are (rightfully) 
beholden to their constituents, and therefore have incentives to adopt economic legislation that 
benefits parochial interests, even if it has a negative impact on non-residents and the national 
economy as a whole. The Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine operates as a check on this 
concern – the same concern that triggered the collapse of the Articles of Confederation and 
prompted the insertion of the Commerce Clause into the Constitution. 
 
Because this dynamic can manifest itself in many ways, courts employ several tests to enforce 
the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The "central rationale for the rule against 
discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic 
protectionism."
6
 Thus, state laws that explicitly discriminate against interstate commerce face "a 
virtually per se rule of invalidity."
7
 But even a facially nondiscriminatory state law may 
nonetheless run afoul of the doctrine if it unduly burdens interstate commerce. Courts evaluate 
such claims under the test announced in Pike v. Bruce Church: "Where the statute regulates 
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
8
  
 
The Pike balancing test played an important role in shaping early Internet regulation, because of 
concern about spillover effects when states regulate online conduct. In the prominent case of 
American Library Association v. Pataki, a district court struck down a New York law that 
prohibited the intentional use of the Internet to send pornographic messages that would be 
"harmful to minors."
9
 The court conceded that shielding New York minors from pornography 
constituted a legitimate state interest.
10
 But it found this interest was outweighed by the 
significant chilling effect the law would have on wholly out-of-state conduct.
11
 Because 
information posted to the Internet is available everywhere simultaneously, those who disseminate 
information online could face liability for posting content that arguably ran afoul of New York's 
law, even if they had no intention of communicating with New York residents.
12
 And this, in 
turn, would chill communication to recipients in states where the content was legal, thus 
imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce far in excess of what little local benefits were 
likely to result from enforcement.
13
 
 
Like many balancing tests, the doctrine is somewhat unpredictable, turning on the facts of 
individual cases. Many state regulations create spillover effects; the Dormant Commerce Clause 
only invalidates those that, in the court's judgment, impose a greater burden on interstate 
commerce than they reap in local benefit – which can differ from case to case. For example, in 
National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.,
14
 Target argued that California's disability law 
burdened interstate commerce by requiring it to modify a nationwide website to meet California 
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requirements – which effectively imposed California law on the company's transactions with all 
customers, even those outside California.
15
 The court found this argument was premature at the 
motion to dismiss stage, explaining that Target could develop a California-specific website, and 
even if it chose not to do so, its decision to develop one product for a nationwide market does not 
necessarily implicate the Commerce Clause.
16
 At a minimum, factual development was 
necessary to determine the "practical effect" of the law on interstate commerce before the court 
could decide the Dormant Commerce Clause issue.
17
 
 
National Federation of the Blind's focus on practical effects reflects the insights of Professors 
Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes, whose seminal Yale Law Journal article, The Internet and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, brought some clarity to this somewhat confusing corner of the 
law.
18
 Goldsmith and Sykes highlight that the primary justification for the Dormant Commerce 
Clause is to "ensure[] free trade among the states and thereby secure[] the associated economic 
benefits."
19
 They thus support the consideration of economic efficiency as the lodestar for such 
claims: "[T[he appropriate statement of the extraterritoriality concern is that states may not 
impose burdens on out-of-state actors that outweigh the in-state benefits."
20
 
 
III. The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Net Neutrality Efforts 
 
Like early state attempts to regulate online conduct, state-level network traffic management 
regulations are susceptible to a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge. The Internet is a national 
(indeed, global) network, meaning that attempts to regulate the flow of traffic on that network 
are likely to have extraterritorial effects. If state net neutrality rules survive a preemption 
analysis, states should be ready for the claim that such regulations unreasonably burden interstate 
commerce and, therefore, contravene the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 
 
The party challenging the law bears the burden of showing the impact on interstate commerce.
21
 
As an initial matter, it is not clear that the existing state-level net neutrality initiatives are limited 
to in-state conduct. For example, Vermont's executive order prevents state agencies from 
contracting for broadband service unless the broadband provider certifies that it does not "engage 
in paid prioritization…to any Internet customer."22 Similarly, Hawaii requires agencies to 
contract only with providers that "demonstrate and contractually agree to support and practice 
net neutrality principles where all Internet traffic is treated equally."
23
 Facially, these restrictions 
can be read to apply not only to contracts with in-state consumers, but with all consumers 
nationwide (or indeed worldwide).
24
 
 
But even if the court construes these restrictions to apply only to contracts with in-state 
consumers, such regulations can disrupt the orderly flow of interstate traffic. Permissible 
network management practices would differ from state to state, depending on whether and how 
each state chose to regulate. Even if all states adopted facially identical statutes, fragmentation is 
likely to occur over time as 50 different sovereigns may reasonably disagree on enforcement. For 
example, what constitutes "reasonable network management" may differ from state to state. 
Broadband providers are thus left with two alternatives: operate a nationwide network that meets 
the standards of the most stringent state – meaning that state's law burdens out-of-state 
communications that would otherwise be legal – or balkanize the network and make the delivery 
of network traffic less efficient, which burdens the delivery of out-of-state communications. 
4 
 
Similar burdens on out-of-state traffic undergirded the Pataki decision, and while National 
Federation of the Blind was less sympathetic to such claims, it did not discard them outright – a 
rather, the court withheld judgment until the magnitude of the burden could be quantified. 
 
State-level traffic management rules also limit the services that carriers can offer on a national 
basis. As Thomas Hazlett has noted, the primary difficulty with state-level regulation of 
networks is the disruption of economies of scale that otherwise would occur at the national 
level.
25
 Importantly, this has a negative effect not only on contracts with end-user consumers, but 
also with services and applications like prioritization or zero-rating that otherwise can be 
marketed to edge providers. As the Commission has observed, edge markets are primarily 
national in scope.
26
 For congestion-sensitive applications such as streaming video or real-time 
video conferencing, prioritization can be a mechanism by which edge providers can deliver a 
better product to consumers without adversely affecting non-congestion-sensitive services. 
Similarly, the ability to zero-rate a particular offering can help expand the planes of competition 
among edge providers and allow smaller providers a chance to gain an advantage over rivals. If 
broadband providers cannot market such services nationally, they are less likely to achieve 
national economies of scale and services will be provided less efficiently. At the extreme, the 
inability to offer prioritization or zero-rating nationally may deter edge providers from 
purchasing and making available such services at all – meaning these consumer-friendly 
offerings will be unavailable even in states where consumers want them and regulators have not 
banned them. 
 
Once plaintiffs have established that a law burdens interstate commerce, the burden shifts to the 
state to establish the local benefit.
27
 Many states have been careful to rehearse the claimed 
benefits of net neutrality rules. The Vermont statute, for example, explains that because the 
Green Mountain State is "a rural state with many geographically remote locations…many 
Vermonters do not have the ability to choose easily between Internet Service Providers (ISPs). 
This lack of a thriving competitive market, particularly in isolated areas, disadvantages the 
ability of consumers and businesses to protect their interests sufficiently," thus warranting 
government regulation.
28
 Similarly, California's legislature found that "[a]lmost every sector of 
California's economy, democracy, and society is dependent on the open and neutral Internet that 
supports vital functions" such as police and emergency services, health services, utilities, and 
education.
29
 
 
But these states may struggle to quantify these claimed benefits in any convincing way. As one 
court noted, "to determine what the ‘practical effects' of the regulation are, courts should inquire 
into the actual effects of the legislation rather than the effects intended by the legislature."
30
 
Indeed, the Pataki court invalidated New York's anti-pornography statute in part because it 
found that that statute likely would have little incremental benefit in practice beyond that already 
conferred by other, overlapping laws.
31
 Similarly, net neutrality skeptics have often cited the 
dearth of evidence that net neutrality rules are necessary to protect consumers from real harm – 
the history of broadband development before the 2015 Open Internet Order and since its 2018 
repeal suggest otherwise. And while net neutrality proponents claim that regulation can promote 
other values – such as the 2015 Open Internet Order's claim of a "virtuous cycle" that net 
neutrality will promote edge investment, which in turn will stimulate demand for greater network 
investment – the evidence supporting these clams is equally thin, as Judge Williams noted in his 
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dissent in US Telecom Association.
32
 (The majority gave the FCC the benefit of the doubt 
because of the "highly deferential" standard of review governing agency predictive judgments in 
administrative settings, and courts may extend similar deference to state legislatures' conclusion 
as well.)
33
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Of course, there is also a political dimension to states' willingness to take net neutrality actions. 
To the extent that the residents of states such as Vermont and California feel more strongly in 
favor of net neutrality protections than consumers in other parts of the country, the states' 
willingness to enact a rule, risk a federal preemption challenge, and expend public time and 
resources on enforcement keeps the political issue alive and signals the strength of their interest 
to national lawmakers, influencing the national debate. In this sense, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the primary catalysts of state net neutrality rules are not state public utility commissioners 
but governors and state legislators. They are directly elected by their constituents and, therefore, 
are well placed to read their constituents' preferences and communicate them nationally. 
 
But the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine checks this political activism, to make sure that 
these states' efforts to register their discontent with federal policy do not unduly burden residents 
of other states whose preferences differ. It is difficult to predict in advance how courts may 
resolve Dormant Commerce Clause claims in this context, given the need to develop a robust 
record of the burdens and benefits of particular state laws and executive actions. But at a 
minimum, one can say that the various state initiatives are susceptible to a Dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge. 
 
The FCC is correct that broadband is an inherently interstate service and that traffic management 
practices are best determined by a national regulator to control the spillover effects that would 
otherwise occur with state-level action. For states that insist upon taking that power into their 
own hands, preemption of state net neutrality laws or executive orders will be the first obstacle, 
and this is where the battle has been joined thus far. But even if the state actions survive a 
preemption challenge, the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine will be yet another gauntlet that 
must be overcome in their quest to undermine the Restoring Internet Freedom Order. 
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, is a Member of the Free 
State Foundation's Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an independent, 
nonpartisan free market-oriented think tank located in Rockville, Maryland. 
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